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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHERREL DRAPER, 
Pla.intiff and R·espondent, 
vs. 
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellan.t. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7214 
Plaintiff in his complaint claims to be th~ owner of 
property therein described and alleges that the Old Mill 
Tavern, Inc., a corporation, in May of 1942 filed of 
record a mortgage in which the Old Mill Tavern, Inc. 
mortgaged certain property, including plaintiff's prop-
erty, to the defendant corporation. The complaint sets 
forth the fact that plaintiff had made a demand upon 
the defendant corporation, as mortgagee, to release the 
property from the mortgage and alleges the refusal of the 
defendant corporation to execute the release form pre-
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sented to it. The prayer of the complaint asks for the 
determination of the Court that the mortgage is null and 
void as to the property therein described and for dam-
ages in the sum of $547.00. 
The defendant filed a motion to strike from the com-
plaint all allegations as to damages as contained in Para-
graph 9 of the complaint and filed a general and special 
demurrer to the complaint and particularly to Paragraph 
9. 
At the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike, 
counsel for plaintiff submitted that the special demurrer 
was well taken, and, the demurrer and motion having 
been taken under advisement by the Court, both plead-
ings were subsequently denied by the Court in their en-
tirety. Defendant then filed its answer in which it ad-
mitted that the plaintiff was the owne~ of the property, 
disclaimed any right or title to the property and con-
sented that judgment be entered quieting plaintiff's title 
against the defendant. 
At the trial of the cause the plaintiff moved to 
amend the complaint by asking for an order of the Court 
requiring the defendant to release the mortgage of rec-
ord which amendment was permitted over the objection 
of the defendant. 
The testimony of the plaintiff. was to the effect that 
some five years after the mortgage was of record he 
found out about it when he sought to obtain a loan on 
the property and at that time had a release prepared for 
which he paid $25.00 and which he submitted to the de-
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fendant for execution. All of this was done before any 
attempt had been made to contact the defendant corpora-
tion. The plaintiff as Page 43 of the transscript states 
he was employed at $14.00 a day and received double 
time for his Saturday and Sunday work. He claims his 
damages for the time expended on Saturdays and Sun-
days which are double time days for him in attempting 
to make contacts with the defendant corporation to se-
cure the release. The plaintiff and the President of the 
defendant corporation live within the same vicinity in 
Cottonwood in Salt Lake County, and Plaintiff never at-
tempted to reach him at the office or at his home and 
yet on one occasion the plaintiff claims he made a trip 
to Ogden to try to locate Mr. Walker when he didn't 
know nor is there any evidence that Mr. Walker was in 
Ogden or doing any work in Ogden, and the testimony 
further shows that the plaintiff never tried to locate Mr. 
Walker at his home or his office before he left on the 
Ogden trip as appears at Page 81 of the transcript. 
When the plaintiff contacted the office girl at the 
defendant corporation after he had spent his time going 
to Ogden, he was immediately informed to contact coun-
sel for defendant, and several conferences were then held 
and a release prepared to be executed and an understand-
ing arrived at that a release would be given on each 
party putting up the sum of $30.00, having a survey 
made of the property line and the fence line readjusted 
to meet the true survey line. This appears at Page 
69 of the Record. The plain tiff states that he has a vio-
lent temper and being provoked in missing an appoint-
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ment at which he was late he then determined not to pro-
ceed under the agreement for the survey, and this suit 
was commenced. AU of this appears at Page 71 of the 
Record. 
At Page 92 of the Record appears the testimony 
showing that a complete understanding had been arrived 
at between counsel, providing for the survey and correct-
ing of the fence lines to meet the results of the survey. 
At Page 93 of the Record is the testimony showing 
that the mortgage between the Old Mill corporation and 
J. B. and R. E. Walker corporation had never been paid. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and 
subsequently entered its judgment quieting the title of 
the plaintiff in the property and affirmatively directing 
the defendant to execute a release of the mortgage and 
giving to the plaintiff judgment of $397.00 against the 
defendant together with costs of $13.20. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
1. The Court erred in overruling the general de-
murrer of the defendant corporation. 
2. The Court erred in overruling both grounds of 
the special demurrer of the defendant corporation. 
3. The Court erred in denying the defendant's mo-
tion to strike Paragraph 9 from the complaint. 
4. The Court erred in making its fifth Finding of 
Fact in this that it found that the plaintiff has at all times 
refused and failed to release or cancel the mortgage, 
which finding is contrary to the evidence; that though 
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the word "plaintiff" may have been used inadvertently, 
should the word be ''defendant,'' said finding is still con-
trary and is not supported by the evidence. 
5. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact 
wherein it found that plaintiff has suffered damages by 
reason of the refusal to release the mortgage by the de-
fendant in the sum of $225.00 for attorneys' fees for the 
reason that said finding~ is contrary to law and not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
6. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact 
wherein it found that plaintiff has suffered damages in 
the sum of $172.00 by reason of 'loss of time in that said 
finding is contrary to law and ~ot supported by the evi-
dence. 
7. The Court erred in its 7th Finding of Fact 
wherein it found that J. B. Walker was an officer of the 
Old Mill Tavern, Inc., and the defendant corporation for 
the reason that said finding is not supported by the evi-
dence, is contrary to the law and is outside of any issue 
involved in this proceeding. 
8. The Court erred in making its second Conclu-
sion of Law wherein the Court concludes that defendant 
should be awarded judgment in the sum of $397.00 for the 
reason that said conclusion is contrary to law. 
9. The Court erred in its second Conclusion of Law 
wherein it assessed costs in the sum of $13.20 for the 
reason that said conclusion is contrary to law and there 
has been no cost bill filed in this case. 
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10. The Court erred in its third Conclusion of Law 
requiring an order of the court issued to the defendant 
to release its mortgage of record, as said conclusion is 
contrary to law. 
11. The Court erred in entering its judgment and 
decree in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendant 
to deliver to the plaintiff a release of the mortgage de-
scribed in said judgment, as said order is contrary to the 
law. 
12. The Court erred in entering its judgment and 
decree awarding damages to the plaintiff and against the 
defendant as appears in Paragraph 3 of said judgment 
in the sum of $397.00 for the reason that such judgment 
- and decree is contrary to the law. 
13. 'The Court erred in entering its judgment as 
appears in Paragraph 3 thereof awarding to the plain-
tiff costs in the sum of $13.20 as said judgment is not 
supported by a cost bill and is contrary to law. 
14. The Court erred in permitting the plaintiff to 
make the amendment to the complaint, as appears at 
Page 41 of the Record, for the reason that said amend-
ment is contrary to law, was not made timely, and changed 
the cause of action without permitting the defendant an 
opportunity to clarify said issues by pleading or pre-
paration to meet said new issue. 
15. The Court erred in its rulings on the presenta-
tion of evidence in overruling defendant's objections and 
permitting plaintiff to introduce testimony as to dam-
age suffered by plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Defendant Is Not Liable To Plaintiff For The Damages 
Provided In 78-3-8, U .C.A. 1943. 
For the assistance of the Court this statute pro-
vides: 
''If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release 
any mortgage ,after the same has been fully satis-
fied, he shall be liable to the mo.rtg~agor for double 
the damages resulting from such failure. Or the 
mortgagor may bring an action against the mor.t-7 
gagee to compel the discharge or release of the 
mortgage after the same has been satisfied; and 
the judgment of the court must be that the mort-
gagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay 
the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages 
resulting from such failure.'' 
Under this section the cause of the action which it gives 
is specified: 
(a) In favor of the mortg,ager and against the 
mortgagee in those circumstances where a mo,rtgage has 
b~en fully satisfied. 
(b) The other situation provided by this section is 
that the mortgagor may bring an action against the mort-
gagee to compel the release of a mortgage after the sam,e 
has been satisfied, in which instance the court must order 
the mortgagee to release and discharge the mortgage and 
pay the mortgagor the cost of suit and all damages re-
sulting from such failure. 
In the case of Hasquet v. Big West Oil Company, 
29 Fed. R. 2d Page 78, the court sets forth the funda-
mental rule : 
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''No right of action for damages exists at 
common law from failure to satisfy a mortgage or 
to release or discharge a lien or other claim 
against real property.'' 
This proposition is further substantiated in the case of 
Morrill v. Title, 162 P. 360, in which the court states: 
"It was stated that no damages were recover-
able at common law for failure to satisfy a mort-
gage * * * and that the only right of action was in 
equity. That this is undoubtedly true is clearly 
shown by the absence of decisions allowing dam-
ages under the common law and by the course of 
'legislation in the United States. * * * To approve 
the rule contended for by counsel for plaintiffs 
would be nothing less than to engage in judicial 
legislation which we must refuse to do.'' 
The further proposition has been substantiated in 
many cases that a statute such as 78-3-8, U.C.A. 1943, is 
penal in nature and will be narrowly construed, and the 
relief to be granted under that statute will not be ex-
tended beyond its terms, nor will any theory of subro-
gation be indulged in to extend the relief permitted by 
such a statute. A few of the cases so holding are the fol-
lowing: Osborn v. Hocker, 160 Ind. 1, 66 N.E. 42; Mur-
phy v. Fleming, 69 Mich. 185, 36 N.W. 787; Wing v. 
Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., 155 Mo. A. 356, 137 S.W. 11; 
Bullington v. Lowe, 94 Okla. 234, 221 P. 502; Brandon 
v. Garland, 211 Ala.150, 100 So.132. 
One of these cases, that of Hope v. United Savings 
and Loan Association, 60 P. 2d 737, was an action in 
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which parties were seeking to extend the benefit of such 
a right of action of the mortgagor to one beyond that 
class: 
''The facts are as follows : The defendant in 
error, who was plaintiff below, and will he so 
designated in this opinion, brought an action to 
foreclose a real estate mortgage, claiming a fur-
ther Hen in addition to the principal which had 
been discharged. Plaintiffs in error, who will he 
hereinafter designated as defendants, in answer 
to plaintiff's petition, denied plaintiff's right to 
any further lien and filed a cross-action for penal-
ty under section 7642, C.O.S. 1921 (section 11266, 
0.8.1931). The defendants were not the original 
mortgagors, but were subsequent purchasers of 
the real estate and owned the same when this ac-
tion was commenced. There was judgment sustain-
ing defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's evidence; 
also judgment denying defendants relief on their 
cross-action. Defendants appeal from the judg-
ment denying relief on their cross-petition. 
"Defendants in their petition in error brief 
several questions, including that of novation, in 
order to bring themselves within the status above 
cited. 'This question was not pleaded below. And, 
although it is insisted that evidence on the ques-
tion was introduced without objection, the same 
falls short for such purpose, in that the original 
mortgagor was not released from the debt. 
'' ( 1) We are of the opinion that there is but 
one question involved in this case; that is, whether 
or not the subsequent purchaser of mortgaged 
real estate may recover the forfeit provided by 
section 11266, supra. On the authority of. the fol-
lowing cases decided by this court it seems con-
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elusive that statutes penal in their nature must 
be strictly construed and limited to operate only 
in favor of those included in the statutory de-
scription of designation: Territory ex rel. John-
ston v. Woolsey, 35 Okl. 545, 130 P. 934; Baugh 
v. Little ,et al., 140 Okl. 206, 282 P. 459; Bullington 
v. Lowe, 94 Okl. 234, 221 P. 502. 
'' (2) It is true that the precise question here 
presented has not heretofore been decided by this 
court, but the cited cases clearly disclose that the 
rule of strict construction is applied to such 
statutes in confining their operation, and there is 
no provision therein that the rights conferred 
thereby shall extend to the assignee of the mort-
gagor, and we do not now feel justified in extend-
ing the statute by implic.ation to include such per-
sons. We find that this provision of our statute 
has had consideration by the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for 'the Eighth Circuit in 
the case of Capps v. U. S. Bond & Mortgage Co., 
27 4 F. 357, and there the court, after reviewing 
authorities of eminent standing, held that the 
statute did not apply in cases such as this. We 
agree with the reasoning and conclusion in such 
opinion.'' 
In the case of Ernest Graham v. Edward Sinder-
man, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200, an owner of property 
mortgaged the property to a broker who forged the 
documents so given him and sold them to the defendant. 
In that case the plaintiff owner of the property who had 
never received any consideration for his mortgage sought 
to have it released of record and to recover double dam-
ages against the defendant. The court refused to permit 
a recovery under such a statute as ours, stating: 
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"Plaintiff asks that defendant be made to 
pay the penalty fixed by statute for refusal to 
discharge the mortgage. This may not be done. 
The statute relates to mortgages s'(J)tisfiled by pay-
ment or f1tll performance of the conditions there-
of." 
We submit that the cause of action permitted by this 
statute rests only in one who is a mortgagor and who is 
amortgagor whose mortgage has been fully satisfied. In 
the principal case the plaintiff was never a party to the 
mortgage involved. There is no contradiction to the fact 
that the mortgage has never been satisfied. The authori-
ties we have cited above are clear to the effect that the 
term "mortgagor" will not be enlarged upon to include 
one whose property has been included in the mortgage. 
There is no relationship between the Old Mill Tavern, 
Inc., and the plaintiff. There is no showing that the 
plaintiff ever before or after the mortgage was placed 
of record derived his property from or through the Old 
Mill Tavern, Inc. In order to permit a cause of action 
in the plaintiff it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
bring himself within the class of a mortgagor. It is in-
conceivable of any theory under which the court could 
assume to make the plaintiff a mortgagor in any respect 
because he has never submitted his property as being 
subject to the provisions of the mortgage nor was there 
in any way any benefit he received by reason of the 
mortgage. It is likewise inconceivable that because some 
third person places a mortgage upon my property that I 
thereby become a party to the mortgage. As impossible 
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as it appears to formulate any theory upon which the 
plaintiff could become a mortgagor or come within such 
a class, it becomes further impossible to understand how 
he can receive the benefit of the statute which permits 
relief only in those instances where the mortgage has 
been satisfied. 'The only evidence in the entire case and 
the actual fact i'S that this mortgage has not been paid. 
We submit that there is no cause of action to the 
plaintiff under the provisions of this statute, and the 
court is entirely and grossly in error in permitting the 
plaintiff to recover by virtue of its provisions. 
n. 
The Court Erred In Permitting The Amendment In Al-
lowing The Affirmative Relief For The Release Of The Mort-
gage And In Denying The Motion To Strike And The Special 
Demurrer, All Of Which Are Combined Under This One Argu-
ment. 
As indicated in connection with the statute 78-3-8, 
there are two options as to the cause of action available 
to the plaintiff. It is submitted that he could avail him-
self of only one of them and not both. In other words, 
he may sue for double damages or he may sue to have 
the mortgage released and aH damages from such fail-
ure, or he could sue in equity to quiet title again!St the 
land. 
It is submitted that upon the plaintiff bringing his 
cause of action, as set forth in his complaint, his com-
plaint was fatally defective and did not state a cause of 
action to permit the recovery of any relief other than 
that of quieting title, because there is nowhere contained 
in the complaint any allegation that the mortgage had 
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been satisfied. There is no allegation of payment appear-
ing whatsoever. 
The defendant was unable to determine from plain-
tiff's complaint which of the two causes of action pro-
vided by 78-3-8 the plaintiff was pursuing, or whether 
an action only to quiet title. 
It is submited that, under special demurrer, we were 
entitled to have this theory clarified, were entitled to 
be advised in any event. 
m. 
The Court Erred In Entering Its Judgment Awarding The 
Plaintiff Damages, As There Was No Evidence Or Findings 
Upon Which Such Judgment Could Be Predicated. 
We are combining under this argument our specifi-
cations of error 5, 6, 8, 12 and 15. 
In this matter the evidence introduced over defen-
dant's objection as to damage was to costs and time lost 
by the plaintiff long prior to any demand for release 
which was made on the defendant corporation and would 
not be competent in any event. As a second proposition, 
it is submited that the time which the plaintiff took off 
and his time in court, all of which he was permitted to 
testify to, could not be included as an element of dam-
age, particularly when it appears that the time for these 
appointments was not time which required him to lose 
work. 
The findings do not show what the element of damage 
was, whether from time loss, loss from interest on mort-
gage, or any other elements claimed by the plaintiff, and 
are so uncertain that they would not support the con-
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elusion or judgment as to any damage suffered by the 
plaintiff. 
IV. 
The ·Court Erred In Awarding To The Plaintiff Attorney's 
Fees. 
There was no known evidence introduced in this 
case as to any work that had been done by an attorney 
in this case nor was any testimony introdueed as to the 
reasonable value of any such work, and under the de-
terminations of this court we submit that the court must 
require testimony before entering such judgment. It is 
further submitted that the item of attorney's fees is not 
recoverable under the penalty provided by this statute 
as it would not be an element of damage recovera;hle to 
the plaintiff unless specifically provided as such by the 
statute. 
v. 
The Court Erred in Entering Judgment For Costs With· 
out A 'Cost Bill. 
As there was no waiver or stipulation in this case, 
we submit that the court erred in ·entering judgment in-
cluding and specifying the costs recoverable by the plain-
tiff. This court has so often ruled that Wie will not add 
length to this brief by citing authorities for the fact 
that those costs are only recoverable upon the furnishing 
of a cost bill. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSON 
and RICHARDS 
Att·o·rneys for Defendant 
and A·pp1ellant. 
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